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For thousands of years humans have harnessed wind energy to improve their living 
conditions.  Historically wind energy provided power to move water:  the Chinese 
began pumping water via wind power in 200 BCE and the Dutch reclaimed thousands 
of acres of land with it during the seventeenth century.  In the modern era, however, 
nations worldwide have employed wind energy to produce clean, renewable, domestic 
electricity.  The impetus for including green alternatives among traditional power 
generation methods stemmed from political and environmental concerns.  The 1973 and 
1979 oil crises revealed many countries’ reliance on imported energy sources, and 
national governments began funding renewable resources research and development.  
In addition to reducing dependency on foreign fossil fuel sources, environmental 
concerns pertaining to global warming and rising sea levels motivated increased usage 
of renewable energy sources and prompted international agreements requiring the 
reduction of carbon emissions.  For instance, European Union environmental policies 
and the Kyoto Protocol established national targets and mandated signatories develop 
strategies for increasing the proportion of energy generated from renewable sources.   
 
While supra-national agreements form renewable energy policy, implementation occurs 
at the local level.  Hence, national and provincial governments often express excitement 
at the prospect of increased renewable energy usage and all the while leaving local 
municipalities to deal with the obstacles and numerous bottlenecks that hinder 
achievement of national goals.  The challenge of devising macro-policy that can be 
translated into implementable micro-policy is not unique to use of renewable energy 
resources; nevertheless, it provides an example of the inherent difficulties in designing 
and applying politically and socially acceptable policy.  Frequently policies are 
theoretically sound yet pose substantial challenges for the bodies responsible for 
implementation – ones typically not included in the policy-drafting phase. 
 
Given supranational mandates and growing public concern over environmental 
changes, the growth of the wind industry is not surprising.  Despite numerous 
advantages to wind energy exploitation, site development is typically not easily 
accomplished and, in fact, is becoming increasingly difficult.  Technological, financial, 
policy, political, and social factors frequently hinder implementation – the latter two 
among the most complicated to address.  Recent research demonstrates success of wind 
power projects depends largely on “institutional arrangements within the policy 
domains of physical planning and energy,” as well as the importance of institutional 
and social factors on implementation rates (Wolsink 2000, 58; Junginger et al. 2004).  
Siting a wind generation facility typically involves agencies at national, 
provincial/state, and local levels, and differences in agencies’ policies and missions can 
delay or even prevent project realization.  Jurisdictional and capacity issues influence 
the government’s side of the siting process, as can the actions of community groups and  
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conservation bodies.  Despite general public support for wind energy power generation, 
proposed projects are frequently contested locally.  Research into public opinion on 
wind energy reveals four out of five people support wind power; however, “it takes 
only one devoted opponent to start…a legal procedure against a planning permit.  This 
is one of the primary reasons why public conflicts over wind power plans have become 
the rule rather than the exception” (Wolsink 1996 cited in Krohn and Damborg 1999, 
959).  As a result it may appear to policymakers that mandating development of wind 
energy generation complements both political and social goals, yet the reality is 
government officials responsible for policy implementation frequently encounter 
political and social resistance because this environmentally benign technology 
frequently generates “not only significant quantities of electricity by also major 
controversies” (Szarka 2004b, 2).  Ultimately political structure and societal demands 
influence a nation’s maximum realizable potential of wind energy.   
 
Over the past two decades, European countries have gained considerable experience 
siting projects in part a result of compliance with supranational mandates.  The national 
governments of Germany, Spain, Denmark, and the Netherlands have made substantial 
investments in wind energy technology development and implementation.  Predictably, 
each nation experienced unique barriers and hurdles, as well as achieved different 
results.  In the Netherlands, despite the establishment of national policy and significant 
financial expenditures, establishment of wind power generation projects has not gone 
as smoothly as in other European countries.  A substantial body of recent research 
reveals reasons for this include institutional constraints, lack of financial incentives, 
insufficient government capacity, and public resistance (Agterbosch et al. 2004; 
Ensensberger et al. 2002; Junginger 2004; Wolsink 1996 and 2000).  Most research has 
focused on how a specific aspect influences realization of wind projects; however, the 
aggregate impact of these on local implementation of national policy remains uncertain.  
Furthermore, while researchers recognized nearly a decade ago that siting problems at 
the local level have been “the major impediment for increasing installed capacity in the 
Netherlands,” policymakers’ apparent failure to overcome these through subsequent 
covenants and legislation necessitates discussion (Wolsink 1996, 1082). 
 
A case study of wind project developments in the Municipality of Delfzijl was 
conducted to determine how local political, jurisdictional, and social factors influenced 
the execution of national policy in the Netherlands.  The study focused on the 
relationship between stakeholder actions and interactions and the various delays in 
project realization which ultimately impedes achievement of provincial, national, and 
supranational wind energy targets.  Understanding this relationship provides the basis 
for formulating practical recommendations for improving macro-policy creation to 
facilitate micro-policy implementation.  Analysis is based on interviews with key 
stakeholders involved with the development of wind projects in Delfzijl, including 
national, provincial, and municipal government officials; civil servants from the  
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provincial and municipal levels; private developers; opposition groups; local citizens; 
consultants; and academics.  The report, furthermore, is based on a substantial literature 
and policy review. 
 
The report is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief overview of the Dutch 
planning system; Section 3 outlines the wind industry’s development in the 
Netherlands; Section 4 presents the Delfzijl case study; Section 5 offers an assessment of 
the national wind policy in the Netherlands; and Section 6 concludes the report with 
recommendations for improving policy formation to enhance wind energy 
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II. The Dutch planning system  
 
The government of the Netherlands – one of the smallest, most densely populated 
countries in the world – has engaged in comprehensive spatial planning for nearly a 
century to cope with competing demands on the small amount of available land.  Just as 
the promotion and maintenance of quality urban and rural environments is important, 
so too is the method of spatial planning.  Fundamental to Dutch governing “is the deep 
rooted conviction that power flows from consensus” (Valk 2002, 204).  While the 1965 
Spatial Planning Act – the legal foundation for spatial planning in the Netherlands – 
specified each government level’s specific role and responsibility, it also provided for 
intergovernmental interaction based on consensus building and mutual adjustment 
(Newman and Thornley 1996; NSPA 1996).  Consequently, spatial planning in the 
Netherlands is a collaborative effort involving four government levels:  supra-national, 
national, and provincial policy guides spatial development and growth, while 
municipalities devise and implement land allocation plans which allow use-by-right 
development.1  Spatial planning policy formation, however, “does not arise in a 
vacuum but is shaped in interaction with stakeholders” (Agterbosch et.al. 2004, 3).  
Dutch citizens have a legal right to participate in spatial planning and increasingly 
individuals and community groups exercise their “right to appeal to administrative 
courts of law” (Valk 2002, 205).  As a result, spatial planning topics that impact multiple 
groups frequently fosters substantial community resistance, and the formation, 
adoption, or amendment of these plans is frequently delayed.   
 
At the close of the twentieth century, growing concern over “the sticky character of 
decision making process” helped propel the topic of spatial planning into the center of 
national political discourse and prompt the Dutch parliament to amend the Spatial 
Planning Law and Environmental Planning Laws to include more coercive planning 
tools (Valk 2002, 206; Faludi and Valk 1994).  While the national government – 
specifically the Minister of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment – could 
compel provincial and municipal governments to conform with national planning 
policy objectives, passage of the Bill of Trajectories and the NIMBY Bill offered methods 
of circumventing municipal authority to “provide a solution to slow decision-making” 
at the local level (Wolsink 2003, 708).  Provincial governments obtained the legal 
authority to over-ride municipal decisions (or lack there of) in order to overcome local 
delays to projects of national or regional importance.  Although hierarchical planning 
has rarely occurred in the Netherlands, recent increases in competing demands for 
limited territory, as well as pressure to meet supranational mandates, increases the 
chance a municipality will be forced to comply with provincial or national directives.  
The recent changes to the Dutch planning system suggest “a strong tendency towards 
the forcible simplification of the complex and conflicting character of spatial planning 
                                                  
1 See Appendix 1 for an overview of each government level’s particular duties and responsibilities.  
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decisions” (Wolsink 2003, 716).  Instead of fixing problems with the Dutch planning 
system, changes could exacerbate the current situation as legislation could increase the 
likelihood of top-down, centralized planning.  This may give rise to questions 
pertaining to social equity and jurisdictional authority; however, Dutch spatial planning 
remains “a matter of fact in spite of obvious flaws in the efficiency and the effectiveness 
of the planning system” (Valk 2002, 201).   
 
During this same time, the national government began emphasizing comprehensive 
environmental planning at all administrative levels and intensification of land uses 
throughout the country.  The Dutch government’s pursuit of comprehensive 
environmental planning stems from a desire to promote development which enhances 
quality of life today and in the future.  Similarly, intensifying land use through 
combining compatible uses could “counterbalance inefficiencies in land use inside and 
outside the built up area on a national, regional and local level” (Valk 2002, 207).  
Unfortunately, short- and long-term quality of life provision frequently entails two 
different courses of action, especially when trying to balance a variety of residential, 
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III. The development of wind energy in the Netherlands  
 
Dutch national wind policy 
Since 1975, the Dutch government – like most of its European counterparts – has 
focused national policy on wind energy development and application through more 
efficient usage and exploitation of domestic resources.  Environmental concerns 
pertaining to global warming and rising sea levels and political motivation for reducing 
dependency on foreign fossil fuel sources inspired this policy direction.  Supranational 
agreements provided an additional catalyst for the formation of domestic wind policy 
in the Netherlands.  Consequently, Dutch wind policy “consists of four interconnected 
policy layers:  municipal, national, provincial and European Union” and reflects the 
specifications and requirements established in supranational agreements (Agterbosch 
et.al. 2004, 3). 
 
Supranational agreements and EU legislation influence national policy 
Among the most influential supranational agreements on the direction of Dutch 
domestic spatial policy are European Union environmental policies and the 1997 Kyoto 
Protocol.  These agreements established national targets and mandated the 
development of strategies for increasing the proportion of renewable energy generated.  
In the early 1990s, the European Community’s Fifth Environmental Action Program 
emphasized the critical importance of Energy Policy in the “achievement of sustainable 
development” and, in 1997, its White Paper specified concrete targets for renewable 
energy:  contribution was to double, from 6 percent in 1997 to 12 percent by 2010 
(Commission of the EC 1993; European Commission 1997).  The White Paper, however, 
did not provide policy directives to assist member nations in achieving these goals.  
Nearly a decade passed before the EU issued concrete policy directives for promoting 
and facilitating member nations’ usage of renewable energy sources.  In 2001, directive 
2001/77/EC established targets for member nations regarding renewable electricity 
power generation, and, two years later, the EU implemented a “market based GHG 
[greenhouse gasses] emissions trading system” and liberalized energy markets (Szarka 
2004b, 3).  These policy directives provided greater incentive and support for member 
nations to reach the 2010 targets, yet directives must be transformed by EU member 
states into national policies, a time consuming process (Blok 2004). 
 
Consequently, the renewable energy policy developed in the late-1990s involved 
predominantly ‘state-centric measures,’ in part because many European nations – 
including the Netherlands – were among the nations which signed the Kyoto Protocol.  
The 1997 Kyoto Protocol established the framework under which signatory nations 
would develop national policies to address global warming and climate change.  
Ratification of the protocol obligated nations to reduce greenhouse gasses by 5.2 percent 
from a 1990 baseline by 2008-12 through whatever means a nation selected (Szarka 
2004b).  Predictably nations have met with varied success, and a majority of policy  
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efforts have centered on increasing production capacity as opposed to reducing 
demand.  In fact, since 2000, the European Union and many of its member nations have 
“taken a perhaps exaggerated interest in energy generation” policy (Szarka 2004b, 4).  
Considering the development of the wind turbine industry in Europe in the 1980s, their 
focus on the development of wind power generation to meet renewable energy targets 
is not surprising. 
 
National targets based on supranational mandates 
The formation of a Dutch national policy pertaining to renewable energy development 
and exploitation is rooted in the 1973 oil crisis which highlighted the county’s 
dependence on foreign fuel sources.  The national government instituted a research 
program for wind energy development and application, and in 1975 introduced policy 
to enhance the development and application of domestic wind resources (Wolsink 1996 
cited in Junginger et.al. 2004, 1054).  Over the next decade, Dutch policy centered 
primarily on research and development.  In the mid-1980s, it began setting renewable 
energy targets:  in 1985, the national government established the goal 1,000 megawatt 
(MW) from wind energy over the next fifteen years (Wolsink, 2000; Verbong 2001 cited 
in Agterbosch et.al. 2004, 1).  Not until the close of the twentieth century, however, did 
the Dutch national government institute renewable energy targets based on 
international mandates (e.g. the Action Plan on Climate Policy issued by the Dutch 
Minister of Spatial Planning, Housing and Environment (1999) (Junginger et.al. 2004, 
1054)). 
 
In 1995, the Dutch Minister of Economic Affairs issued the Third White Paper on 
Renewable Energy, setting a policy goal of 10 percent renewable energy of the total 
national energy supply by 2020 and specified minimum shares for each renewable 
resource (Ministry of Economic Affairs 1995 cited in Junginger et al. 2004).  The policy 
focused on renewable electricity production and established a target of 17 percent of the 
domestic electricity consumption or approximately 6 percent of the total energy 
demand (Junginger et al. 2004).  In lieu of growing concern over the possibility of 
meeting the targets, the national government devised an intermediate goal of 9 percent 
of electricity consumption generated by renewable sources in 2010 – a target which 
corresponds with the EU’s recent directive on renewable electricity (Junginger et.al. 
2004).  
 
The national government, in addition to establishing targets for renewable energy, 
supported development of domestic renewable energy sources through subsidies and 
later incentives.  Efforts were made to improve competitiveness and stimulate the 
market, as well as address political and procedural bottlenecks.  From the outset the 
Dutch government has emphasized the importance of wind power among renewable 
energy generation sources, and the national government drafted covenants to facilitate 
achievement of the national targets.    
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Bestuursovereenkomst Plaatsingsproblematiek Windenergie (BPW) 1991-1999 
The Bestuursovereenkomst Plaatsingsproblematiek Windenergie covenant between the 
national government and seven provincial governments was an attempt to eliminate 
political and administrative obstacles impeding the establishment of wind power 
generation facilities.  Through coordinated national and provincial spatial planning 
policies, the ‘Governmental Agreement on Planning Problems Wind Energy’ would 
theoretically provide ample sites for wind generation facilities and “support the 
installations of 400 MW in 1995 and 1000 MW in 2000” (Junginger et.al. 2004, 1054).  
Unfortunately, the covenant failed to generate the intended results; by 2000, only 450 
MW – less than half of the projected goal – had been realized (personal interview 
January 20, 2005).  The covenant’s failure can be traced to the omission of vital 
stakeholders:  while those responsible for approving wind power generation projects 
were the seven provinces’ municipalities, they were not among the covenant 
signatories.  Including over two-hundred municipalities in a covenant would have been 
an unwieldy process; nevertheless, “an agreement with them would have been more 
effective than with provinces without effective power in siting issues” (Wolsink 1996, 
1085-1086).  Planning space for wind energy is difficult in the best of circumstances, yet 
the national government’s failure to involve municipalities in a process where they had 
an essential role created additional obstacles.  Hence, the national and provincial 
governments’ confidence in the covenant facilitating the realization of targets was ill-
founded since municipalities did not feel responsible for meeting the wind energy 
targets.  The BPW covenant ultimately neglected to address political and administrative 
obstacles to implementation of wind power generation sites, and prompted the creation 
of the Bestuursovereehomst Landelijhe Ontwihheling Windenergie covenant.   
 
Bestuursovereehomst Landelijhe Ontwihheling Windenergie (BLOW) 2001-2010 
In 2001, the Bestuursovereehomst Landelijhe Ontwihheling Windenergie covenant, which 
involved a host of actors at the national, provincial, and municipal levels, was 
established to develop wind energy sites across the nation in order to realize 1,500 MW 
wind generating capacity on land by 2010 and 6,000 MW offshore by 2020 (personal 
interview January 20, 2005; Ministry of Economic Affairs 2001 cited in Junginger et.al. 
2004, 1057).  The provincial targets set out in the BLOW covenant – based primarily on 
location and wind load – were the result of discussions between national and provincial 
government representatives.  Covenant signatories included the Ministries of Spatial 
Planning, Housing and Environment, Economic Affairs, Land Conservation, Military 
Defense, and Transportation and Infrastructure, as well as the Inter-provincial 
Organization (IPO) – representing the twelve provinces.  Vereniging van Nederlandse 
Gemeenten (VNG), the national Association of Netherlands Municipalities, endorsed but 
did not sign the covenant.  Thus, the BLOW covenant – like its predecessor – 
established provincial mandates for wind energy yet did not guarantee the participation 
of Dutch municipalities.  The national government, nevertheless, set a deadline for 
municipalities:  if local governments had not incorporated provincial planning concepts  
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into local land use plans by December 31, 2005 then provincial or national governments 
could step-in and dictate the siting, development, and implementation of wind projects.  
While national and provincial governments rarely use their legal authority to issue 
directives about specific components of local zoning plans, the pressure to achieve 
supranational targets may result in provincial use of this authority (Wolsink 1996; Valk 
2002).   
 
 
Social impact of wind energy development 
Understanding how wind energy developed in the Netherlands is necessary to 
appreciate the past and present challenges municipalities face when trying to 
implement national wind energy policy.  The pioneers of wind energy in the 
Netherlands were small private investors, a majority of whom constructed solitary 
turbines as a supplemental source of income.  Wind cooperatives, independent wind 
power producers, and energy distributors also developed wind sites, and the latter was 
responsible for the majority of installations until the mid-1990s.  Since then, private 
investors have “dominated the market…in the number of turbines, the number of 
projects and the total capacity installed annually” in spite of policy changes which 
disallowed the siting of solitary turbines (Agterbosch et al. 2004, 4).   
 
Despite the Dutch citizenry’s general approval of the concept of wind energy 
utilization, turbine construction prompted location specific concern about the impact of 
project realization; proposals for wind generation facilities were increasingly contested 
locally.  In the Netherlands, like countries worldwide, objections to wind turbine 
construction included visual intrusion, ecological damage, noise pollution, shadow 
flicker, land disruption, public safety, construction disturbance, and electromagnetic 
intrusion.  As early as 1996, research into project siting revealed every wind project 
proposal had prompted public debate that went at least to the municipal council if not 
further (Wolsink 1996).  In fact, while four out of five people support wind power, “it 
takes only one devoted opponent to start…a legal procedure against a planning permit.  
Hence, public opposition to wind generation proposals has become the rule rather than 
the exception (Krohn and Damborg 1999).     
 
Growing public discontent regarding the perceived haphazard siting of solitary 
turbines and wind power generation facilities across the country prompted siting policy 
changes at the national level.  Since “policymaking at higher levels of government 
institutionally restricts policy making at the lower levels” provincial and municipal 
policies were also impacted (Agterbosch et.al. 2004, 3).  In 2000, the Ministry of Spatial 
Planning, Housing and Environment included the public’s demand for turbine 
clustering in the draft version of the Fifth national Policy Document of Spatial Planning 
yet failed to incorporate it in the revised document (Agterbosch et.al. 2004).  Provinces, 
nonetheless, typically integrated clustering requirements into regional land use plans  
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and directed municipalities within their jurisdiction to do the same with respect to local 
land use plans.  “This relatively new institutional condition was not only at odds with 
national spatial planning policy, but also with the initial provincial spatial planning 
policy laid down in the first wind power covenant by VROM in 1991 with the seven 
provinces that have suitable wind conditions” (Novem 1991 cited in Agterbosch et.al. 
2004, 9).  Nevertheless, public opposition and national policy created an environment 
where solitary turbines were no longer permitted and many provinces, including 
Groningen, decided to concentrate wind site development in industrial areas to 
minimize social impacts while fulfilling national mandates.  The decision to concentrate 
wind generation facilities, however, merely transferred discontent – as demonstrated by 
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IV. The Delfzijl case 
 
Background 
In the northern Netherlands, the Province of Groningen developed as a regional center 
for trade and industry given its proximity to the North Sea and Germany (see Figure 1).  
Today its provincial capital – the seventh largest city in the Netherlands – serves as the 
hub of the western Netherlands and northern Germany distribution route, and major 
private-sector industries include transport, logistics, and life sciences.  The capital city is 
home to over 179,000 people or approximately 30 percent of the provincial population, 
and it has exerted a strong influence on surrounding areas since its founding in the 
thirteenth century (Provincie Groningen).   
 
 
Figure 1:  the Netherlands 
 
The Municipality of Delfzijl, situated on the west bank of the Ems estuary which makes 
up the Dutch-German border, has been a significant port and trading center in the 
northern Netherlands for over four-hundred years.  The Eemskanaal provides a 
shipping link between Delfzijl and the provincial capital.  Despite being one of the 
province’s busiest ports, the municipality showed signs of economic decline during the 
mid-20th century.  In 1955, the government located an industrial center near the port to 
foster local economic growth.  Construction of the industrial area, however, 
necessitated the removal of several small villages.  The impact on local residents was 
predictable, and their resentment and distrust of government claims merely heightened 
when the economic recession following the 1970s oil crises slowed industrial 
development in the cleared area.  The housing turn over during the 1970s-1980s 
reflected the difficult economic situation (personal interview February 22, 2005).  
During this time period, mounting public concern over environmental degradation  
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from aluminum industries prompted a push for recruitment of clean industries, just as 
international agreements were established to protect the Waddenzee ecological area.  
While doubtful a proposal for an industrial complex would be approved today given 
the site’s proximity to the Waddenzee, it remains an important element of the local 
economy: the many chemical industries, metal plants, transportation firms, and 
shipyards within the complex provide one-third of local employment opportunities 
(personal interview March 2, 2005). 
 
 
Groningen Province’s experience with wind energy 
Locational advantages and significant wind loads led Groningen to be one of the first 
provinces to participate in the wind energy development in the Netherlands.  A 
participant in the BPW covenant, the provincial focus from the outset was primarily the 
development of large scale power generation projects; nevertheless, its municipalities – 
which were not among the covenant’s signatories – did not feel responsible for 
realization of the provincial target.  Thus, most of the provinces’ initial development 
was solitary turbines on farms.  Early proposals met with little public opposition during 
the permitting process, and by 1990 approximately fifty solitary turbines approximately 
40 meters high had been constructed.  Although the individual turbines did not 
contribute significantly to the provinces’ power supply, they nonetheless generated 
substantial public concern over spatial development patterns.  During the following 
decade, the construction of wind turbines throughout the province and across the 
border in Germany prompted considerable protestations by area residents regarding 
visual changes in the countryside, as well as increased sound pollution.   
 
Public concern for the loss of visual amenities prompted policy changes and impacted 
the provincial government’s method for achieving the BLOW targets.  The provincial 
government – based on public input – devised a policy to minimize random wind 
turbine construction and concentrate development in a few suitable areas.  After 2000, 
the construction of solitary turbines was prohibited, although the rotors and blades on 
existing turbines could be upgraded or replaced but no increase could be made to a 
turbine’s height.  To reach the BLOW target of 165 MW by 2010 and still preserve the 
natural environment, the province opted to concentrate wind projects in areas with the 
highest wind loads and in close proximity to industrial areas (Plan van Aanpak voor 
realisatie van de Groninger BLOW doelstelling; personal interview February 8, 2005).  The 
province designated Eemshaven, Delfzijl, and Lauwersoog, as well as recommended 
the possibility of Veendam, though the latter would necessitate alteration of the local 
land use plan.  The province’s decision was not surprising given the sites’ locational 
advantages, especially Delfzijl:  wind loads are typically higher near the coast; the 
remote, coastal community had a small population; the industrial area was under-
utilized and the public had demonstrated a desire for recruitment of clean industries; 
and power generated onsite could contribute to neighboring industries’ energy  
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demand.  At the same time, the province instituted a participatory project at 
Emmshaven to compensate for prohibiting construction of individual turbines:  
individuals could acquire an option to build one of twenty-one turbines.  The first 
project of this nature and scale met with some opposition from developers; however, 
Groningen Seaports – the property owner and project developer - received over 88 bids 
for the twenty-one turbine sites in the inner industrial area, and a majority of them were 
over three times the minimum 25,000 Euro bid requirement.   
 
Despite provincial leadership’s support for the implementation of Plan van Aanpak voor 
realisatie van de Groninger BLOW doelstelling, as of March 2005, wind power generation 
sites within Groningen had a combined wind generation capacity of only 64 MW.  The 
province is under pressure to achieve its target.  Recently the Minister of Economic 
Affairs proposed the construction of a 50 MW site in Pekelas; the Province refused 
because of the possibility of meeting the 165 MW target through the realization of 
projects at the sites designated in the provincial plan (personal interview).  The 
Economic Affairs Minister’s actions standout given the lack of hierarchical directives in 
the Dutch planning system.  The explanation offered by the Groningen Provincial Wind 
Coordinator for the atypical approach is “it’s going to be difficult to get the total 1500 
MW on land before 2010.  We are at 1000 MW and we have 500 MW more to go in the 
next five years” (personal interview).  An analysis of projects in Delfzijl reveals that 
altering municipal land use plans to conform to the provincial plan created some 
delays, yet much of the hold-up has been a consequence of jurisdictional challenges and 
project specific opposition.  The Ministry of Spatial Planning, Housing and 
Environment is currently in the process of creating an emergency law (noodwet geluid) to 
speedup the siting process and the Province of Groningen has the authority to step in 
and direct municipalities spatial planning to achieve the BLOW targets after December 
31, 2005.  Nevertheless, Delfzijl case reveals the multitude of problems which localities 
frequently experience when attempting to implement national policy. 
 
 
Implementing national policy in Delfzijl 
Attempts to realize wind generation projects in Delfzijl have involved – not always of 
their own accord – national, provincial, and municipal officials; private developers; 
landowners; community members; and environmental organizations.  Analysis of the 
events of the past fifteen years demonstrates stakeholder interactions served both as 
catalysts and impediments to the development of the Delfzijl South, Delfzijl North, and 
Delfzijl Industrial sites.   
 
In the early 1990s, the first discussions pertaining to development of wind generation 
facilities in Delfzijl took place between municipal officials and local parties – primarily 
farmers.  As the municipality desired the site to be developed uniformly (i.e. one site 
layout and turbine type) and initial proposals offered by farmers and energy companies  
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conflicted, the municipality insisted the groups work together to devise a common plan.  
Between 1995 and 1997, the municipality established agreements for projects on the 
land south of the industrial site; in 1997, they awarded development of the Delfzijl 
South site to Millenergy BV – a building consortium comprised of the energy companies 
Essent, Siemens, and Koop.  The consortium’s plan to construct forty wind turbines on 
the site, however, was delayed for over seven years due to legal challenges brought 
forward by another developer and community members, as well as procedural delays. 
 
Just as Millenergy BV began requesting permits, High Energy – another project 
developer – purchased farmland near the Delfzijl South site.  The Dutch planning 
system does not permit construction of wind turbines on agriculturally zoned land; 
thus, the company first faced the lengthy task of obtaining a zoning change from 
agriculture to industrial – a process which was completed in 2001.  High Energy then 
proposed a project that did not conform with the design of Millenergy BV’s project.  As 
the municipality wanted uniform development, the council rejected High Energy’s 
initial proposal and insisted, as it had previously, the developers collaborate.  This 
proved to be very problematic, in part because Millenergy BV was further along in the 
development process and had already invested significant time and capital into their 
project layout.  Problems ensued and legal measures were taken – including High 
Energy (then BANC Holding) filing suit against the municipality over the issuing of 
permits to Millenergy BV.  The firms eventually negotiated a settlement. However, the 
process delayed realization of both projects.   
    
The delay of the Delfzijl South project, moreover, was a consequence of the lengthy 
planning procedures involved.  Pubic hearings, surveys, and other opportunities for 
public opinion of the proposed project had to be conducted.  Moreover, to obtain 
building permits a milieueffectrapport (MER) or environmental impact assessment had to 
be conducted.  A MER – which is only required for projects over 15 MW or involving 
more than ten turbines – outlines the existing conditions and anticipated consequences 
of the project.  Once a developer has filed reports on all the specified directives, the 
MER is reviewed by the municipality and a MER commission whose members are 
appointed experts from the national level.  Following approval by the commission, a 
public hearing is arranged for pubic comment on the MER and the draft decision for 
approval or rejection of the project (Spatial Planning of Wind Turbines; personal 
interviews March 2 and 22, 2005).  Citizens can file objections with the municipality at 
this time.  If there are no objections or they are addressed by the municipality, then the 
spatial plan will be adjusted and a building permit issued.  This process could take 
seven months:  four months for a building permit, three months for an environmental 
permit.  However, if the municipality cannot address citizens’ concerns, objections can 
be filled with the province.  If citizens feel their concerns still have not been adequately 
addressed, a challenge could go all the way to Den Haag – where it can sit for up to a  
Local impediments to realization of national policy: the role of stakeholders in siting wind projects  16 
 
 
year just waiting to be heard.  As a result, one or two people have the power to delay 
projects for a long time.   
 
While discussions between project developers and public officials had been ongoing 
since the early 1990s, Delfzijl residents became aware of project proposals in August 
1999 when the local newspaper published an article about the Delfzijl South site 
proposal.  The mayor and municipal council supported Millenergy BV’s plan to raise 
forty-120 meter turbines in the beginning of 2000, yet some area residents were less 
enthusiastic about the prospect of having one of the then largest wind parks in Europe 
in their community.  Apprehension transformed into opposition following a public 
hearing in Fall 1999 when, according to some local citizens, Millenergy representatives 
dismissed all questions as ‘minor problems.’  Citizens living in close proximity to the 
site formed a foundation (Stichting Windhoek) and used their political influence and all 
legal measures possible to prevent the project.  The events in Delfzijl reaffirmed what 
researchers have long recognized:  oppositional behavior – which becomes “salient at 
the moment that a project is introduced to the public” – stems from public unease at the 
impact of wind turbines on the local landscape (Wolsink 1996, 1087).   
 
In lieu of community resistance to construction of wind turbines in Delfzijl, delays and 
legal challenges were the rule for the developers of Delfzijl South.  Municipal officials 
and project developers are quick to point out virtually all projects – regardless of the 
type – are challenged, frequently on environmental grounds given proximity to the 
Waddenzee.  Local opposition, nonetheless, delayed the local permitting process.  After 
nearly six years, public challenges for the most part were overcome and permits issued.  
Construction of the first six turbines on the Delfzijl South site, which had been one of 
the first projects proposed, commenced in winter 2004-2005.  The turbines should be 
generating 12 of the sites intended 47 MW by year’s end. 
 
During this same time period, the province disallowed the siting of solitary turbines 
and appointed Eemsmond and Delfzijl as sites for concentrated development.  In 
Delfzijl, this shift prompted significant resentment among public officials, area 
residents, and property owners.  It irritated municipal officials because they had 
supported construction of solitary turbines as it offered farmers both a source of power 
generation and supplemental income from any additional energy produced (personal 
interview March 2, 2005).  The province, however, required municipalities to amend 
local land use plans to reflect the modified regional spatial plan.  The change came as 
quite a surprise to Delfzijl residents, especially those who had requested but not yet 
received building permits.  Those that received building permits could still construct 
turbines; those that had not were unable to do so.  A few farmers tried in court to force 
the municipality to issue building permits, but to no avail.  Predictably, this policy 
change cultivated resentment amongst many farmers towards the development of other 
local wind generation projects – something they could no longer do.  It also fostered  
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some discontent amongst those at Groningen Seaports, the landowner of the sites 
designated by the province for “maximum” development. 
 
Groningen Seaports has a mission of industrial attraction for the economic benefit of the 
entire region and was not entirely pleased about being co-opted into the production of 
wind energy.  Nevertheless, as its shareholders are representatives from the Province of 
Groningen and the municipalities of Delfzijl and Eemsmond, the organization chose to 
“make the best of it” and direct development to their advantage.  Groningen Seaports 
devised a master plan which located turbines in the Delfzijl North and Industrial sites 
along company owned infrastructure near the grid connections.  The approach 
minimized the potential impact siting turbines might have on prospective investors 
who might have concerns about locating near wind turbines and it eliminated possible 
conflicts between neighboring companies because one had a turbine and another did 
not.  Furthermore, it provided Groningen Seaports with the revenues from power 
generation.  In 1998, Groningen Seaports awarded the contract for Delfzijl North – 
nineteen turbines along a dyke on the northern edge of the industrial area – to EDON 
(now Essent) which entered into a joint-venture (Millenergy BV) with Koop and 
Siemens (see Figure 2).  As of March 2005, Millenergy BV’s project proposal was nearly 
completed, and the developer was in the process of applying for the environmental 
permits (personal interview March 2, 2005).  Realization of the Delfzijl Industrial site, 
however, is further off.  In March 2005, the Delfzijl Industrial site was still in 
development stage; however, a Groningen Seaports representative indicated that 
bidding for the contract to develop the site would most likely occur within a few 
months with the anticipation of awarding the contract around September.   
 
 
Figure 2:  Delfzijl North  
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While a host of social and procedural obstacles hindered development of wind projects 
in Delfzijl, ultimately the greatest source of delays is from the very people who created 
the impetus for the projects in the first place:  the politicians.  Wind energy is very 
political, as demonstrated by policy changes resulting from modifications in the 
composition of the municipal council.  In 1999, the municipal council had a favorable 
view of wind energy and supported development of the Delfzijl South, North, and 
Industrial projects.  Opposition by area residents, however, led to the formation of a 
new political group and election of its members to the municipal council the following 
year.  The political atmosphere towards wind energy changed dramatically.  In 2000, 
the newly elected council had to decide on amendments to the spatial plan.  In spite of 
concern over noise, environmental changes and public safety, they approved the plan 
because the municipality had already issued permits.  Nevertheless, public discontent is 
partially responsible for the delays Millenergy BV experienced acquiring permits for the 
Delfzijl South site, as well as the shift in local political attitude towards the Delfzijl 
Industrial and North projects:  the municipal council no longer supports their 
development (personal interviews March 17 and 22, 2005).   Although recent national 
legislative changes pertaining to a municipality’s responsibility for damages incurred as 
a result of construction of wind turbines has been cited for delays in issuing permits, 
changes in local political sentiment certainly plays a part in procedural holdups – 
especially since the mayor and council are responsible for issuing building permits and 
environmental permits.  Whether or not the municipality of Delfzijl desires to see the 
North and Industrial sites developed, the province and national governments do, and, 
while the municipal level is essential for the realization of wind projects, the approach 
of the December 31, 2005 deadline signifies an opportunity for the provincial 
government to step-in and force the municipality to follow provincial directives and 
develop the site.  This would be a very big political move in the Netherlands, but there 
is little concern about political repercussions from such a move since its ‘merely’ 
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V. Assessment and recommendations 
 
Evaluation of wind policy implementation in Delfzijl 
From the beginning, executing national wind policy in Delfzijl has been problematic:  
political, jurisdictional, and social factors delayed approval of local wind projects and 
thereby impeded achievement of wind energy targets.  An evaluation of local policy 
implementation and stakeholder actions reveals many impediments to realizing wind 
projects can be traced to the following:  (1) a mismatch between national policy and 
local needs and desires; (2) uncertainty at the local level given national and provincial 
policy changes; (3) a lengthy, complex permitting system with many opportunities for 
pubic challenges; (4) uncertainty due to stakeholders’ strategic actions; (5) insufficient 




Problems municipal officials and developers experienced in Delfzijl are partially a 
consequence of a policy mismatch.  The decision to construct wind turbines – at least 
with respect to location and intensity – was ultimately made by people outside the 
community.  Granted municipalities frequently must contend with decisions made by 
national and provincial officials; even so, when higher level policy conflicts with local 
needs and desires – even if only for a segment of the local population – difficulties arise.  
Research confirms what occurred in Delfzijl:  “the predominantly top-down policy style 
and the consequently ineffective planning of wind-turbine siting” is responsible for the 
stagnating implementation rates (Wolsink 2000, 59).   
 
The national government made a fundamental mistake when establishing the BLOW 
covenant’s provincial targets:  municipal representatives were not included.  
Discussions included representatives from the twelve provinces, Ministry of Spatial 
Planning, Housing and Environment, Ministry of Economic Affairs, and even wind site 
developers.  The province even offered to increase the provincial target when 
conversations with local developers revealed their intention to realize projects with 
greater capacity than the earlier target.  The private sector’s predetermined energy 
generation goals not the Municipality’s desire for wind generation projects were the 
deciding factor.  Furthermore, provincial policy directives prohibiting solitary turbine 
siting by the municipality of Delfzijl and designating land owned by Groningen 
Seaports for future wind generation developments reveals the disconnect between the 
desires of the higher governmental level and local stakeholders.  Since achieving wind 
energy targets depends “on the freely consented commitment of political and social 
actors,” it is not surprising that national wind policy implementation has been 
problematic (Szarka 2004b, 10).   
 
  




“Policy is an important source of intended and unintended change,” and national and 
provincial policy creation or amendment impacted the municipal government’s 
responsibilities, opportunities, choices, and actions (Agterbosch et.al. 2004, 3).  The 
national and provincial governments’ very act of establishing the BLOW covenant with 
its wind energy production targets foisted responsibilities onto the municipality of 
Delfzijl, particularly when the province specified the locality as a site for concentrated 
development.  Whether or not Delfzijl community leaders and citizens wished to 
construct wind turbines, the decision had been made and the municipality had to deal 
with the consequences.   
 
Policy changes at higher governmental levels restricted municipal and citizen influence 
on the siting process and resulted in uncertainty and delays in the municipality’s wind 
project approval processes.  For instance, the provincial government’s alteration of the 
regional plan to prevent siting solitary turbines and insistence the Municipality of 
Delfzijl change their local land use plan limited the municipality’s control over local 
spatial planning and how renewable energy targets would be realized.  It also caused 
delays due to the time needed to amend the plan.  National policy changes – specifically 
the repeated changes in financial liability for decreases in property value – also slowed 
the municipality’s approval of projects.  Originally if a property owner incurred a loss 
in property value because of the siting of wind turbines, the individual could receive 
compensation by filing a claim with the local authority.  Municipalities typically had 
signed agreements with the project’s developers to cover these claims.  In 2003, the 
highest court in the Netherlands issued a ruling that prohibited municipalities from 
passing the financial responsibility to developers and, thereby, made municipalities 
liable for all damages to private property from the construction of wind turbines.  
Following this decision, municipalities predictably stopped approving projects.  This 
prompted the national government to review the matter, and a new reparation law is 
anticipated within a few months.  As a result, many municipalities – including Delfzijl 
on Millenergy’s Delfzijl North project – are awaiting this change before issuing new 
building permits in order to avoid financial liability. 
 
National and provincial policy changes have a dramatic impact at the local level.  Over 
the past decade, municipalities have witnessed an increase in national and provincial 
directives pertaining to development patterns.  Although not unique to development of 
wind energy, these directives limit municipal control over development within their 
jurisdiction.  Some municipal officials believe it has gone too far:  certain developments 
are no longer possible, while others demand lengthy investigations and reports as part 
of the approval procedure.  As one Delfzijl civil servant succinctly stated:  “the people 
who make the rules and laws at the national level do not understand the impact the 
legislation will have in areas like this.  Sure, they think about it but they cannot  
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appreciate the consequences:  how it will work in practice or what the actual impact 
will be.”  
 
Policy conflicting with ‘problematic’ permitting system  
As the Delfzijl civil servant pointed out, policymakers often fail to appreciate the 
practical challenges involved with implementing policy.  As the case study 
demonstrates, realization of wind energy projects involves a multitude of stakeholders 
with a wide range of goals and agendas, and the structure of the Dutch permitting 
system is such that any one of them can frustrate a project for years and thwart 
achievement of national goals.  In the Netherlands, the time path of any project is 
dependent on obtaining permits.  Wind generation projects necessitate building, 
environment, waterworks, and defense permits.2  Theoretically the permitting process 
could be completed within two years; however, there are many opportunities for 
delays.  In fact, there are four different points in each of the permit phases when citizens 
can challenge a project.  Sixteen million people can agree with the project but if one 
person disagrees, the Dutch permitting structure is such that a citizen can stall a project 
for years.  Usually the delay is only a year or two because the highest court will hear a 
case earlier if a developer demonstrates the project is an economic benefit to the region; 
however, sometimes all a developer can do is wait.  Developers have no way of 
predicting whether or not they will encounter resistance; hence, the siting and approval 
process is unpredictable and potentially lengthy.  
 
Millenergy BV experienced repeated delays attempting to get municipal and provincial 
approval and building permits for the Delfzijl South project.  Local opposition groups 
challenged the project at every possible point.  Stichting Windhoek representatives 
appealed to the Municipal Council, the MER Commission, the local court and, 
ultimately, Den Haag.  Although those objecting to the project represented a small 
number of local citizens, they managed to obstruct the project for nearly six years.  
Furthermore, differences in municipal and provincial expectations also created delays.  
Halfway through the permit process, Millenergy BV had to obtain provincial approval 
for a permit.  Although the site conformed with municipal specifications, the province 
directed the developer to change aspects of the project design: turbines had been laid 
out to minimize problems for the farmers; however, the province wanted turbines in a 
grid pattern.  The delay was costly from both a time and financial standpoint.   
 
The difficulty Millenergy BV encountered trying to get municipal approval and 
building permits demonstrates how local opposition impacted the permitting system.  
It, furthermore, reveals how policymakers’ failure to comprehend and compensate for 
the delays inherent within the Dutch permitting system could result in failure to 
                                                  
2 Environment for projects over 15MW and in special situations; waterworks if the project involves the 
use of dikes or other land within the waterworks jurisdiction (Spatial Planning of Wind Turbines).  
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achieve the national goals.  The existing permitting system, where one or two people 
can block a project for years on end, clearly does not work.  Millenergy BV’s experience 
in Delfzijl was not unique.  In fact, it mirrored events in so many Dutch communities 
that the problematic nature of the permitting system has come to the attention of 
national officials and politicians (personal interview March 22, 2005).    
 
Lack of stakeholder communication 
From the beginning, politicians and project developers committed the ‘engineer’s and 
planner’s fallacy’ by assuming since research indicated broad public support for 
renewable energy that Delfzijl residents would support local wind generation projects 
(Wolsink 2000).  A significant difference, nonetheless, exists between wind energy as a 
theoretical concept and wind turbines as acceptable structures in the local landscape.  
Consequently, the mayor, municipal council, and developers – who treated the 
announcement of the Delfzijl South project as if ‘the cathedral is built’ – were surprised 
when local residents – who resented not having a voice in wind project development 
and siting discussions from the beginning – opposed projects.  The actions of Stichting 
Windhoek, nevertheless, confirmed what researchers have long recognized:  “lack of 
communication between the people who shall live with the turbines, and the 
developers, the local bureaucracy, and the politicians seems to be the perfect catalyst for 
converting local skepticism, and negative attitudes into actual actions against specific 
projects” (Krohn and Damborg 1999, 959). 
 
Opposition stemmed from the perception that municipal officials under pressure to 
“allow projects because of Kyoto and Den Haag” had not dealt with the local citizenry 
openly and honestly from the beginning (personal interview February 22, 2005).  
Segments of the Delfzijl population felt marginalized and this bred a degree of 
resentment and distrust of the officials and developers involved with wind projects.  
Citizens’ frustration intensified when their concerns were not taken seriously and 
dismissed as mere NIMBYism. 3  Since research on public responses to facility siting 
shows “the public are offended when they are treated as selfish and irrational,” officials 
and developers should have anticipated local resistance to project proposals (Wolsink 
1994, 851).  Both stakeholders, nevertheless, found it easier to blame flaws in the 
permitting structure than their lack of communication with the community – an action 
which prompted the formation of a new political party, a shift in the makeup of the 
municipal council in 2000, and changes in the working relations for developers (i.e. 
permitting delays).  Although communication with local residents may not have 
alleviated all concerns, at least it would have eliminated residents’ fear of the unknown 
and minimized distrust of those involved in the process.   
 
 
                                                  
3 Not-in-my-backyard sentiment.  
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Stakeholders’ strategic actions 
Delays in project realization in Delfzijl can be attributed not only to a lack of 
communication between the government and community members, but also to the fact 
that everyone involved had a double agenda.  Very few stakeholders acted ‘candidly.’  
While neither unexpected nor unique to this case, the impact on the local siting process 
is nonetheless significant as it fostered distrust and frustration among those involved.  
Examples of stakeholders’ strategic moves include: 
 
•  Policymakers creating national wind policy based on overestimations of 
potential resources, available sites, and favorable public opinion – something 
that apparently has not changed with the formation of subsequent policy 
documents (Wolsink 1996).   
 
•  The Province of Groningen designating locations for concentrated development 
in Eemsmond and Delfzijl where they were a shareholder and could influence 
project realization.  The province is both a shareholder privy to the 
organization’s master plan and one of the approving bodies for wind generation 
projects. 
 
•  The province’s establishment of the BLOW target at 165 MW.  The Provincial 
Wind Coordinator’s decision to contact a local developer to find out how much 
megawatts they were planning to develop can either be viewed as determining if 
an increase was possible or ensuring the targets would be achieved.  Either way, 
it was a politically savvy move given the pressure from the national government 
to meet the target. 
 
•  A provincial official attaching his political future to realization of BLOW target.  
Political parties are very important in the Netherlands.  Since his political future 
depends on achieving what the political party wants, wind projects in Delfzijl 
can be pushed through without any political repercussions because he is ‘merely’ 
carrying out a national directive. 
 
•  The Municipality of Delfzijl forcing developers to work together in order to 
minimize their own headaches and compensate for their lack of capacity to 
handle the directive passed down to them by national and provincial 
governments. 
 
•  Millenergy BV attempting to maximize profits and minimize procedural delays 
by building the Delfzijl South project such that an environmental permit is not 
required.  As Dutch law states that projects less than 15 MW do not necessitate 
an environmental permit, Millenergy BV appears to be circumventing the 
environmental permit by constructing the project’s 2 MW turbines six at a time.    
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•  Groningen Seaports designing the Delfzijl Industrial project such that wind 
turbines can be removed if they interfere with attracting industries and in such a 
way that protects their political shareholders.  If a firm can prove through reports 
that an existing wind turbine would be hazardous to their interest, it could be 
removed. This would allow local politicians to say “Yes, I’m in favour of green 
energy; however, if we do not remove it we won’t be able to attract this company 
which would bring ‘this’ many new jobs.”  
 
•  Stichting Windhoek’s selective use of the press and judicial system to oppose 
wind projects.  The foundation sometimes uses the local newspaper to start 
discussions with developers and municipal officials by making them aware of 
potential problems; other times the foundation files a legal complaint explaining 
the problems and lets a judge handle the situation. 
 
•  Stichting Windhoek’s shift from local to national opposition.  Most local 
opponents live in villages geographically concentrated around the site; however, 
their impact has begun to reach beyond municipal and provincial borders all the 
way to Den Haag.  Leaders of Stichting Windhoek concluded that acting locally 
was not sufficient:  it required significant energy and produced little results.  
Locally things happened because of projects.  Provincially things happened 
because of BLOW.  National policy drives actions at both levels; hence, 
something had to be done in Den Haag.  Consequently, Stichting Windhoek 
joined a national foundation to achieve the greatest effect from their limited 
resources. 
 
Summary of wind policy implementation in Delfzijl 
The Delfzijl case study demonstrates how problematic implementing national policy 
can be for a municipality.  Although establishing the BLOW covenant provided a 
framework and targets for local officials, “experiments with ‘plans of approach’ and 
‘covenants’ as instruments for co-ordination have the shortcoming that, once the agreed 
policy measures have to be carried out, these measures have to follow the legal tracks of 
physical planning and environmental policy” (Bouwer 1994).  In other words, covenants 
must be carried out to the letter of the law.  This created timely delays for the realization 
of wind projects, as the lengthy permitting process for the Delfzijl South project 
demonstrates.   
 
The permitting and procedural delays developers encountered can also be linked to 
policy changes, jurisdictional differences, and lack of stakeholder involvement.  Even 
though “the Dutch planning system enjoys an image of a system that involves a 
significant amount of collaborative planning, in practice that process is mainly limited 
to consensus building between governmental agencies and authorities on various 
levels” (Wolsink 2003, 719).  Typically only ‘key’ groups and individuals are involved  
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from an early point even though research and experience has repeatedly demonstrated 
that inclusion of diverse stakeholders is critical for the success of wind generation 
initiatives.  The opposition of some Delfzijl municipal council members and segments of 
the population reveals “acceptance is not usually to be commanded;” lack of 
communication and involvement of stakeholders frequently fosters implementation 
problems, which impede the achievement of wind power generation mandates (Szarka 
2004b, 10).   
 
One of the most significant challenges the Delfzijl case brings to light is the difficulty 
municipalities face implementing national policy given capacity constraints.  A recent 
study found “institutional constraints are more important than public acceptance” 
(Wolsink 2000, 62).  If local governments do not posses sufficient capacity, then 
implementation of spatial policies will suffer (Priemus 2002).  Delfzijl officials’ 
insistence project developers collaborate was an attempt to compensate for capacity 
constraints; nevertheless, policymakers passing the implementation burden to the 
jurisdictional level with the fewest financial and personnel resources clearly influences 
the time required for project realization and national target attainment. 
 
The Delfzijl case reveals both the pressure on municipalities to develop wind projects 
and provincial and national concern over repeated delays.  When policymakers 
designed the BLOW covenant, they provided provinces authority to direct municipal 
spatial planning if a municipality failed to incorporate provincial plans into local plans 
by December 31, 2005.  The provision offers a method of ensuring project realization to 
meet wind generation goals.  Stakeholders and academics, nevertheless, wonder 
whether or not the province would make such a ‘big’ political move.  While developers 
may desire such an event if for no other reason than it would simplify the situation by 
eliminating one bureaucratic level, other stakeholders questioned why those involved 
in drafting the BLOW covenant did not formulate an implementable policy which 
addressed both national and municipal needs instead of including an ‘over-ride’ clause 
which may or may not be used given the nature of the Dutch political system. 
 
 
The Delfzijl experience:  the pitfall of the policy and implementation gap 
Despite government mandates, incentives, and subsidies, the implementation of 
national wind policy has turned out to be an arduous process in the Netherlands 
(Agterbosch et.al. 2004).  The events in Delfzijl offer a textbook example of the obstacles 
that arose because policymakers failed to draft policy in such a way as to transform 
theoretical concepts into executable actions.  A review of academic research and 
discussions with government officials support the case study findings.  Some 
impediments to the fulfillment of Dutch wind targets can be attributed to social and  
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economic factors outside national government’s control.4  Nevertheless, policymaker’s 
skewed perception of public support for wind generation projects and the omission of 
key stakeholders from policy discussions resulted in the formation of a national wind 
policy inundated with barriers to application. 
 
From the outset, implementation has been plagued with difficulties due to inherent 
differences between policy development and realization.  National, provincial, and local 
governments confront different pressures from different constituencies; hence, 
governments view policy issues differently.  If policymakers fail to realize and 
compensate for such differences, those executing the policy will undoubtedly encounter 
problems – as seen in the Delfzijl case.  Dutch officials made fundamental errors when 
drafting wind energy policy:  “national policy was based on the expectation that local 
authorities, who decide on the site selection and building permits, will consistently 
decide in favor of wind energy installations” (Wolsink 1996, 1081).  When creating 
policy targets Ministry of Spatial Planning, Housing and Environment and Ministry of 
Economic Affairs officials, moreover, overestimated both the number of available wind 
power generation sites and public support for the development of those sites.  Officials 
assumed sites which could be used for wind power generation, would be used for it, 
and citizens – which theoretically favored wind power generation – would support 
wind turbine construction on local sites.  As the Delfzijl case demonstrates, the situation 
was not as simple as national officials believed, and siting wind turbines proved to be 
quite problematic given requirements of the Dutch planning system.  Although the 
“application of wind energy is governmental policy,…changing a zoning scheme is a 
local political decision” (Wolsink 1996, 1085).  Most local land use plans lacked the 
necessary zoning for wind turbines and had to be amended before a municipality could 
issue any building permits.  This laborious and time consuming process for acquiring 
the zoning changes and building permits became even more so because local citizens 
challenged proposed projects.  A number of government officials expressed surprised at 
                                                  
4 Failure to site turbines induced additional economic and political challenges to the realization of wind 
energy targets.  Despite the government’s attempts to stimulate projects through financial incentives, 
political and jurisdictional hurdles prevented realization of enough projects to support the creation of a 
domestic market “sufficient for serial production” (Wolsink 1996, 1085).  Consequently, the EU’s 
liberalization of the green electricity market on July 1, 2001 resulted in the importation of approximately 
80 percent of green electricity consumed in the Netherlands (Energeia, 2002/2003 cited in Agterbosch 
et.al. 2004).  The national government decided the following year to concentrate on developing wind and 
biomass electricity generation projects to meet renewable energy targets and determine if planning 
approval and building permit procedures could be streamlined to expedite realization of these projects 
(Junginger et.al. 2004, 1057).  Nevertheless, despite increasingly favorable “economic and technical 
conditions for Dutch wind power exploitation,” the importation of green electricity is preferred (i.e. less 
costly monetarily, politically, and socially) to installing new wind power generation facilities in the 
Netherlands, and the Minister of Economic Affairs recently announced foreign renewable energy may be 
used to supplement domestic sources in order to comply with renewable energy goals (Agterbosch et.al. 
2004; Junginger et.al. 2004).  
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public resistance to a policy they believed conformed with public opinion favoring 
development of renewable energy sources.  Nevertheless, its authors’ inability to 
distinguish between general and project specific support when creating policy resulted 
in challenges for those tasked with implementation. 
 
As the Delfzijl case illustrates, the national government’s failure to include “the actors 
that actually execute the power over siting decisions…in the agreement with the central 
government” hindered realization of wind national policy (Wolsink 1996, 1087).  
Inclusion of local stakeholders would have aided in the formation of executable policy 
and fostered a sense of responsibility among municipalities to achieve the national 
targets.  Since the BPW covenant did not obligate municipalities to participate, many 
municipal councils felt little impetus to work towards realization of national wind 
energy goals.  A clear example of this was in 1996 when the government transferred 
from a subsidy to financial incentive system:  “although subsidies were being awarded 
by Novem (an executive office of the Ministry of Economic Affairs), construction 
permits were not yet being awarded by local authorities, which is a clear inconsistency 
in government policy on different levels” (Agterbosch et.al. 2004, 7).  Policymakers, 
nevertheless, omitted municipalities again when developing and signing the BLOW 
covenant, despite the consequence their absence had on meeting the BPW targets.  
While this time provinces were granted authority to step-in if local councils were not 
cooperating by the mid-point review, this ‘safe-guard’ might not have been necessary 
had the national government taken institutional and psychological factors more 
seriously and included municipalities from the beginning (Wolsink 1996).5   
 
The situation in the Netherlands demonstrates a fundamental challenge to policy 
development:  policies which are theoretically sound often pose significant challenges 
for those responsible for execution.  Difficulties frequently arise when translating a ‘big-
picture’ idea into policy that can be implemented on-the-ground, as well as when 
applying policy at the local level which was devised by provincial or national 
authorities.  Dutch wind policy illustrates the first through the national and provincial 
governments’ support for development and implementation of renewable energy – seen 
in the signing of the Kyoto Protocol and BLOW covenant respectively – but shift of 
implementation responsibility down the government chain without providing adequate 
                                                  
5 Although incorporating municipalities in policy development could have increased chances of their 
participation in realization of national targets, mere inclusion in the development of a wind covenant 
does not necessarily indicate policy endorsement.  Six national ministries signed the BLOW covenant, but 
wind energy may be a very low priority for some agencies.  For instance, the Ministries of Land 
Conservation, Military Defense, and Transportation and Infrastructure may have signed BLOW in order 
to be in a better position to stop the initiative or cooperate only when it in their interest (i.e. other 
ministries are willing to make concessions to get a ministry to agree to something) (personal interview 
January 20, 2005).  
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policy support measures. 6  The challenges Dutch municipalities faced with policy 
implementation were compounded by the national government’s formation of policy 
which conflicted with local interests and needs.  The jurisdictional aspect of the problem 
is not unique to creating wind energy policy; nevertheless, the national government’s 
failure to address it – especially when designing the second covenant – merely served to 
compound the problems which arose from formulating policy that did not 
corresponded with the specifications of the Dutch planning system and based on faulty 
assumptions (i.e. public support for wind generation projects and the number of 
available sites).  As one researcher found, “the integration of plans may be possible, 
especially if they do not have a specified character with real (economic) consequences 
for societal groups and activities.  In the implementation and the carrying out of the 




























                                                  
6 Their behaviour, nevertheless, mirrors that the of the EU which established concrete targets for 
renewable energy use among member nations in 1997 but failed to institute policy directives to assist 
them in accomplishing this aim until 2001.    
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VI. Lessons from Delfzijl:  improving policy to aid implementation  
Interviews with national, provincial, and local stakeholders reveal how bureaucratic 
issues have plagued national policy implementation locally, various stakeholders 
affected policy changes, and a lack of involvement by local groups hindered the 
realization of wind projects in Delfzijl and – ultimately – the achievement of the 
national renewable energy production goals.  When questioned about their opinion of 
the outcome at Delfzijl, many of the stakeholders expressed the sentiment “we made the 
best out of the problems that got shifted on to our board.”  Nonetheless, many of the 
challenges stakeholders encountered in Delfzijl could have been avoided.   
 
Instead of creating new policy to rush projects through the planning system or creating 
multiple bureaucratic layers, policymakers’ efforts would be better spent designing 
policy which incorporates local, provincial, and national interests. 7  This is not a 
revolutionary idea.  For over two decades, researchers have recommended 
policymakers drafting “policy on diffusion of energy efficient technologies should take 
institutional and psychological factors more seriously for becoming more effective” 
(Wolsink 1996, 1088).  Thus, Dutch policymakers’ inclusion of local stakeholders when 
developing and signing the BLOW covenant could have facilitated national policy 
implementation at the local level.  Although decision-making processes that necessitate 
multiple players at multiple levels are inherently problematic and lengthy, the Delfzijl 
case study reveals failure to include local stakeholders in discussions is equally 
challenging and time consuming.  Given supranational agreements and national targets, 
wind turbines have to go somewhere.  The Netherlands is a small country with limited 
land for siting turbines.  Inclusion of municipal officials in policy development might 
have facilitated the realization of projects because stakeholders could have found a 
balance between environmental, social, and industrial issues given known constraints.  
Stakeholders still might have determined Delfzijl was among the best locations for 
development of wind generation facilities in the province and possibly even the nation; 
however, the decision would have been more palatable locally because it included 
municipal representatives  
 
Similarly, the municipal government’s inclusion of Delfzijl citizens from the beginning 
would have minimized local challenges to proposed projects.  People resented not 
having a say in the decision, especially since it involved a general societal benefit with a 
negative local effect (i.e. renewable energy production and construction of wind 
turbines next door).  Hence, the opposition project proposals generated did not 
necessarily reflect citizens’ attitudes toward the development of wind generation 
facilities in Delfzijl; it often stemmed more from the manner in which projects were 
developed (i.e. the decide-announce-defend model (Ducsik 1987 cited in Wolsink 1994)) 
or citizens’ lack of trust of other stakeholders involved.  Informing Delfzijl citizens 
                                                  
7 I.e. the NIMBY Law and the proposed emergency law (noodwet geluid).  
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about projects during the development phase could have warded off much of the 
subsequent opposition by alleviating public concern about ‘unknown’ future changes in 
the local landscape – a landscape which had already been radically changed for the 
creation of the industrial area.  Regardless of local sentiment about the construction of 
turbines, if the public had been involved from the beginning projects might already be 
producing electricity instead of the current controversy.  Just as lack of communication 
leads to opposition, “information and dialogue is the road to acceptance” (Krohn and 
Damborg 1999, 959). 
 
Even though academics frequently recommend early involvement and greater 
participation of all stakeholders, there are two fundamental problems with these 
suggestions:  it is virtually impossible to do it effectively for a topic like wind energy 
and even if it could be done, it is highly unlikely it would be done.  First, theoretically 
discussions with stakeholders could enhance a project’s likelihood of approval; 
however, there is a big difference between negotiating with several groups and sixteen 
million individuals.  Some people are never going to like wind energy and will fight 
every project to the highest court.  Democratic decisions are difficult when any one 
individual can frustrate the system, as is the case in the Netherlands given the structure 
of the planning system.  Second, the reality is too much money and power is at stake 
over the development of wind generation facilities for stakeholders to work together 
openly and honestly. 8  Hence, other methods of improving inter-jurisdictional policy 
development and application must be pursued.   
 
Attempts to develop wind projects in Delfzijl clearly demonstrate the challenges 
inherent in macro policy development and micro-policy implementation. There is, 
unfortunately, no magic bullet; no easy fix.  There are, nonetheless, several things which 
can be done to improve how macro-policy is implemented at local levels for the 
majority of stakeholders.  First, policy needs to be designed so it fits within the planning 
and legal framework.  That way if it is the best place for something, it will end up there 
fairly and in a timely fashion.  Second, policymakers must distinguish between general 
and project specific support.  Otherwise there will be problems when moving from a 
theoretical goal to actual policy.  Third, policy must be based on actual numbers and 
reliable research findings.  Inflating numbers or developing policy based on 
                                                  
8 According to one stakeholder, Koop made a big mistake early on.  They knew about both the Delfzijl 
South and North projects and could have optimized the situation in the beginning by putting all their 
cards on the table and combining the two projects.  Instead, they chose to pursue the projects 
independently in attempt of making a higher profit.  Market factors and politics, however, do not always 
match-up.  There was a lot of money at stake, but because Koop choose to work with Essent and Siemens 
(i.e. Millenergy), they ultimately lost out to politics.  Time delays resulted in new dictates that necessitate 
adjustments of their plans – activities that involved substantial time delays.  Had they done it differently, 
all of the turbines would probably be operational by now.  It was a financial gamble they took, but it did 
not pan out.    
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generalizations only enhances the likelihood of implementation problems.  Fourth, 
policy must be developed in a way that minimizes jurisdictional conflicts, especially 
during the implementation phase.  It may take longer to develop, but it will save time 
later on.  Fifth, policymakers need to be cognizant of the limitations at other 
jurisdictional levels and design policy to compensate for this rather than exacerbate it.  
Sixth, recognize that policy, as well as policy changes, will limit options for 
municipalities and drafting new policy that contradicts existing policy merely creates 
additional problems.  Seventh, government officials need to evaluate and improve how 
information is conveyed to the public.  Frequently policymakers and public officials do 
not recognize how the citizenry perceives the information distributed by the 
government.   
 
Underlying these recommendations, however, is the assumption stakeholders desire to 
see the siting process improved.  Even if this is true, the question remains ‘better for 
whom’?  Politicians with higher career aspirations?  Developers in search of financial 
gain?9  Provincial residents who dislike the impact of solitary turbines on the 
landscape?  Local citizens who cannot agree on desirable development patterns?10  
Municipal officials under-pressure to implement national policy?11  Environmental 
groups divided between support of national agendas and local concerns?  Just as there 
are critical differences between stakeholders’ interests, so too are there fundamental 
differences in their definitions of ‘improvement.’  Does it involve better site design or 
fewer turbines?  Does it mean earlier project realization or the prohibition of wind 
developments altogether?  Establishing a definition for ‘policy improvement’ is 
essential to finding ways to address anything but the procedural problems in the 
current Dutch wind policy. 
 
American planner Norman Krumholz once remarked, “there will be a future that will 
be worthwhile if we are committed to making it so.”  Policymakers have the capability 
of improving ways of moving from macro-policy development to micro-policy 
implementation.  The question is whether or not they are committed to doing so.   
                                                  
9 Many national and provincial politicians want these projects; renewable energy is ‘hot.’  According to 
one project developer there is always going to be incentives for renewable energy projects.  Nevertheless, 
the nature of the incentives is constantly changing but many firms are willing to take risks on project 
development (personal interview March 22, 2005). 
 
10 Some citizens do not necessarily like wind turbines and would prefer not to see them, however, they 
recognize that siting them in an industrial area where the landscape has already been damaged is not a 
‘big deal.’ Since developers can construct high buildings in the area, wind turbines are not an issue of 
concern.  Other citizens believe wind turbines are a threat to the polder and even more so the Waddenzee 
estuary. 
 
11 As of March 2005, the Province of Groningen had realized only 64 MW of the 165 MW target and the 
Minister of Economic Affairs had proposed the construction of a 50 MW site in Pekelas.  
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Appendix I:  Dutch governments’ planning duties and responsibilities 
 
National government 
Spatial planning at the national level incorporates the Central Government (de regering), 
Parliament’s First (Eerste Kamer) and Second Chambers (Tweede Kamer), Council of 
Ministers (Ministerraad), National Spatial Planning Commission (Rijksplanologische 
Commissie), National Spatial Planning Agency (Rijksplanologische Dienst), and Advisory 
Council for Spatial Planning (Raad voor de Ruimtelijke Ordening).  The Central 
Government is primarily responsible for proposing and implementing spatial 
legislation, while the Parliament accepts or rejects proposed legislation (First Chamber), 
amends and initiates bills (Second Chamber), and reviews policy implementation and 
budget expenditures.  The actual creation of spatial planning policy typically occurs in 
the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (VROM) and is 
coordinated by the Council of Ministers (Ministerraad).  The National Spatial Planning 
Agency (Rijksplanologische Dienst), an official organization within VROM, supports 
ministers’ planning efforts by “conducting research and giving advice on spatial 
planning matters and monitoring compliance with the Spatial Planning Act”  (NSPA 
1996, 9).  Moreover, the agency prepares and presents recommendations to the National 
Spatial Planning Commission – the entity responsible for formulating interministerial 
planning policy.  Notwithstanding the contribution each entity makes to Dutch spatial 
planning policy formation and implementation, the primary responsibility for 
designing national spatial policy falls on the Council for Spatial Planning and the 
Environment (Raad voor Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieuhygiene) – whose members are 
ministers and secretaries of departments which influence spatial planning (NSPA 1996).  
Lastly, the Advisory Council for Spatial Planning oversees the dissemination, 
promotion, and discussion of national policy issues and objectives between the 
government and citizenry. 
 
In the Dutch planning system, national plans and policy documents provide a basic 
structure and direction for provincial and municipal planning efforts.  For instance, the 
national spatial planning policy document (nota over de rumtelijke ordening) – prepared 
by the National Spatial Planning Agency – details the general principles and guidelines 
for medium- and long-term spatial planning policy, while the national structure plan 
(structuurschema) outlines sector specific guidelines and principles critical to national 
planning policy (Faludi and Valk 1994).  National government policy provides direction 
for spatial planning, but Dutch municipalities retain primary authority over 
development within their jurisdiction.  Nonetheless, the national government – 
specifically the Minister of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment – possesses 
legal authority to issue directives (aanwijzingen) or exemption provisions (uitzonderings-
bapalingen) to compel provincial and municipal government actions conform with 
national planning policy objectives (Valk 2002).  National authorities, however, rarely  
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exercise their coercive power to make provinces and municipalities alter elements or 
sections of their zoning schemes. 
 
Provincial government 
Each of the twelve provincial governments guides the spatial development within its 
territorial boundaries.  Provincial planning as a rule follows national directives; 
nevertheless, provinces enjoy a certain level of autonomy and control over the methods 
employed to realize national policy within the province.  This stems, in part, from the 
fact provincial plans are not legally binding on all matters.  Consequently, provincial 
planning serves more as a framework for municipal implementation of national policy 
(Newman and Thornley 1996). 
 
The citizens of each province elect a Provincial Council (Provinciale Staten) and this body 
directs spatial planning through approval of the regional plan (streekplan) and spatial 
planning policy documents.  Additionally, the Provincial Council makes appointments 
to the Provincial Spatial Planning Commission (Provinciale Planologische Commissie) – the 
administrative body charged with “discussing spatial planning issues and advising the 
provincial government on the implementation of the task required of that level of 
government under the Spatial Planning Act” (NSPA 1996, 13).  Representatives from 
various national entities, interest groups, and non-governmental experts also sit on the 
Commission, and the elected Provincial Council is required to “consult the Provincial 
Spatial Planning Commission in advance about all measures and plans that affect 
spatial planning in the province” to ensure sound decisions are made (NSPA 1996, 13).  
Mirroring the division of responsibilities at the other governmental levels, the 
Provincial Executive (Gedeputeerde Staten) – like the Central Government at the national 
level – bares primary responsibility for creating regional plans and applying Provincial 
Council directives.  Furthermore, civil servants in the Provincial Spatial Planning 
Agency (Provinciale Planologische Dienst) perform the day-to-day spatial planning 
research, registry, and policy application activities.   
 
As with national policy directives and plans, those devised at the provincial level offer 
municipalities within its borders guidance and direction for their own planning efforts.  
The regional spatial plan (streekplan) provides an outline for future provincial 
development in accordance with national spatial framework plans; however, the 
regional policy document is not binding on all matters (Newman and Thornley 1996; 
Valk 2002; NSPA 1996).  Regional plans generally detail “the chosen direction of 
development and, where necessary, of the phases in which that development can or 
should be completed…explanatory maps illustrating these main points where 
possible…and an explanation, setting out the ideas and results of relevant research and 
consultations that form the basis of the plan” (NSPA 1996, 14).  In addition to devising 
the regional plan, a province directs spatial planning through establishing regulations  
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and directives pertaining to particular local land use plans and approving or rejecting 
proposed municipal land use plans (goedkeuring bestemmingsplannen). 
 
Municipal government 
Dutch municipal governments play a small part in the development of spatial planning 
policy yet are instrumental to the execution of spatial plans.  The division of municipal 
planning duties mirrors that at the provincial level:  the elected Municipal Council 
(Gemeenteraad) devises local spatial planning policy and plans, the Municipal Executive 
(College van Bugemeester en Wethouders) implements plans, and the Municipal Spatial 
Planning Department (Dienst Ruimtelijke Ordening) or private consultant offers technical 
assistance and support to the Municipal Council (Newman and Thornley 1996; NSPA 
1996).  The key differences between provincial and municipal planning efforts relate to 
planning authority:  municipalities establish legally binding land use plans but 
provinces can reject said plans or withhold approval until demanded changes are made. 
 
Dutch municipalities have the legal authority to produce local structure plans 
(structurrplan) and land allocation plans (bestemmingsplan).  A local structure plan – 
similar to a regional spatial plan – offers a basic outline for future municipal 
development.  Although municipalities are not obligated to create structure plans, the 
Spatial Planning Act stipulates they must devise land allocation plans for all rural areas 
and recommends development of plans for urban areas (Newman and Thornley 1996; 
Valk 2002).  The only legally binding plan for Dutch citizens and government bodies, a 
local land use plan specifies future uses in particular areas.  It is “undoubtedly the most 
important spatial planning instrument at the local level” as it is the basis for municipal 
decisions regarding the issuing of building and construction permits 
(bouwvergunningen, aanlegvergunningen), although municipalities can issue exemptions 
(uitzonderings-bepalingen) (NSPA 1996, 18).     
 
Although the laborious process of creating and adopting land allocation plans takes 
place at the municipal level, both provincial and national governments can influence 
local spatial planning.  Since 1994, provincial and national governments have had the 
authority to compel a municipality to alter a land allocation plan “to comply with 
national or provincial spatial planning policy.  If there is a project of national or regional 
importance the Provincial Executive or the Minister may intervene directly in the 
municipal plan-making.  They may oblige a municipality to grant an exemption to the 
local land use plan and issue the necessary permits (e.g. the building permit)” (NSPA 
1996, 19).  Since compliance with land allocation plans is mandatory, national and 
provincial governments can influence the direction local planning takes.   
 
European Union 
In addition to the impact of domestic government bodies on spatial planning, Dutch 
planning policy is influenced by international bodies.  Following the Second World  
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War, a European community formed to facilitate international cooperation on topics of 
mutual interest.  This union has evolved significantly from its tenuous beginnings as an 
agreement between six western European nations establishing a common coal and steel 
community to a consortium of twenty-five nations working on economic, political, 
environmental, and social objectives.  The signing of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 
signified the ‘community’ system’s expansion into the European Union with its newly 
introduced policy areas and decision making procedures.  Treaties between members 
confer authority to the European institutions (the European Commission, European 
Parliament, Council of European Union, and Court of Justice), as well as their policies 
and rulings.   
 
As a member of the European Union, the Netherlands is required to integrate EU 
spatial planning rulings into its national plans.  “EU policy statements on innovation, 
social exclusion, equal opportunities, rural development, urban environmental policy 
and unemployment all influence the context for national policymaking in its member 
countries….‘Brussels’ increasingly prescribes technical standards that have to be met by 
EU member states, for example with respect to pollution control, external safety, EIA 






























Agterbosch, Susanne, Walter Vermeulen, and Pieter Glasbergen.  2004.  
“Implementation of wind energy in the Netherlands:  the importance of the 
social-institutional setting.”  Energy Policy 32:  2049-2066. 
 
Bird, Lori, Mark Bolinger, Troy Gagliano, Ryan Wiser, Matthew Brown, and Brian 
Parsons.  2005.  “Policies and market factors driving wind power development in 
the United States.”  Energy Policy 33:  1397-1407. 
 
Blok, Kornelis.  2004.  “Renewable energy policies in the European Union.”  Energy 
Policy (Article in Press). 
 
Bourillon, Christopher.  1999.  “Wind Energy – Clean Power for Generations.”  
Renewable Energy 16:  948-953. 
 
Bouwer, Klaas. 1994.  “The Integration of Regional Environmental Planning and 
Physical Planning in the Netherlands.”  Journal of Environmental Planning and 
Management 37 (1):  107-116. 
 
Braam, H. and L.W.M.M. Rademakers.  February 2004.  “Guidelines on the 
Environmental Planning in the Netherlands.”  Report presented at Global Wind 
Energy Conference, Paris 2002. 
 
Brittan, Jr., G.G.  2001.  “Wind, energy, landscape:  reconciling nature and technology.”  
Philosophy and Geography 4(2): 169-184. 
 
Burton, Phillip J.  1994.  “The Mendelian compromise:  A vision for equitable land use 
allocation.”  Land Use Policy 12 (1):  63-68.   
 
CIA.  The World Factbook – Netherlands.  September 21, 2004.  
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/print/nl.html 
 
Dietz, Ton, Piet Hoekstra, and Frans Thissen.  2004.  The Netherlands and the North Sea:  
Dutch Geography 2000-2004.  Utrecht, Netherlands Geographical Studies 325. 
(check reference) 
 
Energie.  2002.  Spatial Planning of Windturbines: Guidelines and Comparison of European 
Experiences. Comité de Liaison Energies Renouvelables, France. 
  
Local impediments to realization of national policy: the role of stakeholders in siting wind projects  37 
 
 
Enzensberger, N., M. Wietschel, and O. Rentz.  2002.  “Policy instruments fostering 
wind energy projects – a multi-perspective evaluation approach.”  Energy Policy 
30:  793-801. 
 
European Union.  2001.  Directive 2001/77/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 27 September 2001 on the promotion of electricity produced from renewable energy 
sources in the internal electricity market.  European Parliament and Council of the 
European Union, Brussels, Belgium. 
 
European Union.  2003.  How the European Union Works:  A citizen’s guide to the EU 
institutions.  European Commission, Brussels, Belgium. 
 
Faludi, Andreas and Arnold van der Valk.  1994.  Rule and Order Dutch Planning Doctrine 
in the Twentieth Century.  Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, the 
Netherlands. 
 
Haas, R. et al.  2004.  “How to promote renewable energy systems successfully and 
effectively.”  Energy Policy 32:  833-839. 
 
Junginger, M., S. Agterbosch, A. Faaij, and W. Turkenburg.  2004.  “Renewable 
electricity in the Netherlands.”  Energy Policy 32:  1053-1073. 
 
Jean-Baptiste, Philippe and Rene Ducroux.  2003.  “Energy policy and climate change.”  
Energy Policy 31:  155-166. 
 
Kamp, Linda M., Ruud E.H.M. Smits, and Cornelis D. Andriesse.  2004.  “Notions on 
learning applied to wind turbine development in the Netherlands and 
Denmark.”  Energy Policy 32:  1625-1637. 
 
Krohn, Soren and Steffen Damborg.  1999.  “On Public Attitudes Towards Wind 
Power.”  Renewable Energy 16:  954-960. 
 
Lake, R.W.  1993.  “Rethinking NIMBY.”  Journal of American Planning Association 59 (1):  
87-93. 
 
Linden, Gerard, Paul Ike, and Henry Voogd.  2004.  “Issues in Environmental and 
Infrastructure Planning” in Environmental and Infrastructure Planning edited by 
Gerard Linden and Henk Voodg.  GEO Press, the Netherlands. 
 
National Spatial Planning Agency.  1996. Spatial Planning in the Netherlands – Bodies and 
Instruments.  Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, 
Department of Information and External Relations.  The Hague.  
Local impediments to realization of national policy: the role of stakeholders in siting wind projects  38 
 
 
Newman, Peter and Andy Thornley.  1996.  Urban Planning in Europe:  International 
competition, national systems and planning projects.  Routledge, London. 
 
Priemus, Hugo.  2002.  “Spatial-economic investment policy and urban regeneration in 
the Netherlands.”  Environment and Planning C:  Government and Policy vol. 20:  
775-790. 
 
Provincie Groningen:  History and Key Figures.  www.provinciegroningen.nl  (January 
23, 2005) 
 
Reiche, D. and M. Bechberger.  2004.  “Policy difference in the promotion of renewable 
energies in the EU.”  Energy Policy 32:  843-849. 
 
Sawin, J.  2004.  “National policy instruments.  Policy lessons for the advancement and 
diffusion of renewable energy technologies around the world.”  International 
Conference for Renewable Energies, Bonn.  http://www.renewables2004.de 
 
Smith, Douglas J.  May 2004.  “Wind Power Project Developers Face Many Challenges.”  
Power Engineering. Pp. 46-52. 
 
“Spatial Planning in the Netherlands.”  February 06, 2003.  http://www.netherlands-
embassy.org/printerfriendly.asp?articleref=AR00000294EN (September 3, 2004) 
 
Szarka, Joseph.  2004a.  “Wind Power, Discourse Coalitions and Climate Change:  
Breaking the Stalemate?”  European Environment 14:  317-330. 
 
Szarka, Joseph.  2004b.  “Wind power and policy integration.”  Greening of Policies – 
Interlinkages and Policy Integration.  Conference on the Human Dimensions of 
Global Environmental Change, Berlin, 3-4 December 2004. 
 
Thayer, Jr.., R.L.  1994.  Gray World, Green Heart:  Technology, nature and the sustainable 
landscape.  New York: John Wiley.    
 
Tjallingii, S.  1996.  “Ecological Conditions:  strategies and structures in environmental 
planning.”  DLO Institute for Forestry and Nature Research, Wageningen:  The 
Netherlands. 
 
Tjallingii, S.  2000.  “Ecology on the edge:  Landscape and ecology between town and 
country.”  Landscape and Urban Planning 48 (3-4):  103-119. 
 
van der Valk, Arnold.  2002.  “The Dutch planning experience.”  Landscape and Urban 
Planning 58:  201-210.  
Local impediments to realization of national policy: the role of stakeholders in siting wind projects  39 
 
 
Walker, Gordon.  1995.  “Renewable energy and the public.”  Land Use Policy 12 (1):  49-
59. 
 
Wolcott, Barbara.  December 2004.  “Sun, Wind, Water, Earth:  Communities are taking 
another look at alternative energy systems.”  Planning:  4-7. 
 
Wolsink, Maarten.  1996.  “Dutch wind power policy:  Stagnating implementation of 
renewables.”  Energy Policy 24 (12):  1079-1088. 
 
Wolsink, Maarten.  1994.  “Entanglement of Interests and Motives:  Assumptions 
behind the NIMBY-theory on Facility Siting.”  Urban Studies 31 (6):  851-866. 
 
Wolsink, Maarten.  2000.  “Wind power and the NIMBY-myth:  institutional capacity 
and the limited significance of public support.”  Renewable Energy 21:  49-64. 
 
Wolsink, Maarten.  2003.  “Reshaping the Dutch planning system:  a learning process?”  
Environment Planning A vol. 35:  705-723. 
 
Woods, Michael.  “Conflicting Environmental Visions of the Rural:  Windfarm 
Development in Mid Wales.”  Sociologia Ruralis 43 (3):  271-288. 
 
 